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NOTE
Improving Patent Quality Through Post-Grant
Claim Amendments: A Comparison of European
Opposition Proceedings and U.S.
Post-Grant Proceedings
Jennifer R. Turchyn*
Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to encourage innovation, strengthen U.S. patents, and achieve greater uniformity with foreign patent systems. The America Invents Act introduced two new post-grant patent
validity proceedings: inter partes review and post-grant review. The new U.S.
proceedings are similar to European opposition proceedings, but there are significant differences in the extent of the patent owner’s ability to amend claims,
the patent’s claim construction, the patent owner’s evidentiary burden, and
the procedural requirements. The U.S. proceedings result in a very limited
opportunity for amendment and a high percentage of invalidated patents. In
contrast, European opposition proceedings are generally more conducive to upholding patents, whether in original or amended form. The current U.S. practice for amending claims in post-grant proceedings should be changed to both
achieve balance between claim vitality and extent of opportunity to amend,
and to serve the America Invents Act’s goals of strengthening patents and encouraging innovation. A full adoption of the European opposition claim
amendment practice, particularly the claim construction standard and expansive opportunity for amendment, would fail to balance claim vitality and ease
of amendment, favor patent owners, and disserve the goals of the America
Invents Act. This Note nevertheless advocates for adoption of certain European
characteristics to improve U.S. post-grant proceedings.
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Introduction
President Obama signed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”)
into law on September 16, 2011.1 The AIA introduced the most significant
change to U.S. patent law in over half of a century.2 One of the AIA’s most
meaningful changes was the creation of new post-grant patent-challenge
procedures at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).3
These new administrative procedures allow third parties to contest the validity of issued patents without going to federal court.4 A desire to strengthen
U.S. patents5 and defend against nonpracticing entities6—that is a patent
1. Remarks on Signing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011 Daily Comp. Pres.
Doc. 644 (Sept. 16, 2011); Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents
Act: Part I of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 435, 435 (2012).
2. Edward J. Pardon & Shane A. Brunner, Boosting Creative Competition: America Invents Act, Wis. Law., Oct. 2012, at 6; see Matal, supra note 1, at 435.
3. See Pardon & Brunner, supra note 2, at 9.
4. See Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy
1046–47 (6th ed. 2013).
5. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
6. See Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They
Work in Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 93, 94 (2012).
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holder “that [does] not practice the invention, but instead licenses or asserts
its patents to generate revenue”—drove the introduction of U.S. post-grant
proceedings.7 The AIA also sought to achieve uniformity with other patent
systems throughout the world, which have embraced post-grant patent-challenge procedures for several years.8
The AIA’s post-grant proceedings offer several advantages when compared to U.S. district court litigation, such as a shorter timeline and the
involvement of technical experts. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“Board”) of the USPTO conducts the proceedings. Made up of administrative patent judges with legal and technical expertise, the panel is well suited
to navigate the complex scientific concepts embodied in patents.9 The AIA
procedures serve as quick, cost-effective alternatives to district court litigation over patent validity.10 District court patent validity judgments generally
either invalidate patent claims or uphold patent claims as “not invalid.”11 In
contrast, the new administrative proceedings offer a third outcome: upholding patent claims in an amended form.12 This possibility of amendment enables fine-tuning of patents that will make them more resilient to future
challenges. The elimination of invalid patents and the fine-tuning of valid
patents will strengthen the U.S. patent pool by increasing the average quality
of patents.
The AIA permits patent owners to attempt to amend potentially invalid
patent claims rather than having the Board invalidate the claims. However,
outcomes from the first three years of the new proceedings suggest that the
opportunity to amend is extremely limited.13 Although the AIA contemplates multiple chances at amendment, the Board rarely affords patent owners more than one opportunity in practice.14 The number of procedural
requirements that a patent owner must meet before the Board will consider

7. Xun (Michael) Liu, Note, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent
Assertions Away from Small Businesses, 19 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 489, 490–92
(2013). Nonpracticing entities are also referred to as “patent trolls” or “patent assertion
entities.”
8. For example, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See generally Stephen H. Frishauf, Oppositions, 4 APLA Q.J. 93 (1976).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012).
10. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011).
11. See infra note 37.
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d).
13. Ryan Davis, 5 Surprises from the First 2 Years of AIA Reviews, Law360 (Sept. 11,
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/575447/ [https://perma.cc/YE4R-Z9CD] (“Getting
such approval [to amend] has been a herculean task, as the board has denied nearly all motions to amend to date.”).
14. Michael J. Kasdan et al., Lessons from the 1st Year of Post-Grant Proceedings, Law360
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/485734/ [https://perma.cc/NF98-FU9K] (“[A]
patent owner in an [amendment] proceeding will, in most cases, have only one limited bite at
the apple.”).
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the technical merits of a proposed claim further limits a patent owner’s ability to amend patent claims.15 Patent owners are also subject to an unfavorable claim construction and high evidentiary burden in motions to amend.16
As of November 2015, the Board has only granted five motions to amend.17
The European Patent Office conducts comparable post-grant patent validity proceedings called “opposition proceedings,” but the opportunity to
amend patent claims is greater in the European Patent Office than in the
USPTO. The Implementing Regulations for European opposition proceedings permit patent owners to make amendments to the description, claims,
and drawings.18 As in the United States, however, new matter that the disclosure does not support is prohibited.19 Amendments in European opposition
proceedings often take the form of a main request and one or more secondary requests, called “auxiliary requests,” to be considered in the
alternative.20
Both U.S. post-grant proceedings and European opposition proceedings
require patent owners to prove the patentability of proposed amended
claims. But European proceedings are limited to a showing of patentability
over prior art that is already cited in the proceeding.21 In contrast, patent
holders in the United States must show patentability over all prior art known
to the patent owner.22 Finally, European opposition proceedings are conducted on a much more flexible timeline than U.S. post-grant proceedings,
and this timeline favors substantive examination of proposed amendments
over adherence to rigid procedural rules.23 Opposition proceedings are common; about 5.5 percent of all granted patents are eventually challenged.24

15. See infra Section II.D.
16. See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
17. REG Synthetic Fuels LLC v. Neste Oil Oyj, No. IPR2014-00192, 2015 WL 3609359, at
*15 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2015); Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. 5th Market, Inc., No.
CBM2013-00027 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2015); Riverbed Tech., Inc. v. Silver Peak Sys., Inc., No.
IPR 2013-00403, 2014 WL 7405746, at *22 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2014); Riverbed Tech., Inc. v.
Silver Peak Sys., Inc., No. IPR2013-00402, 2014 WL 7405745, at *21 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2014);
Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc. v. United States, No. IPR2013-00124, 2014 WL 2120542, at *10
(P.T.A.B. May 20, 2014).
18. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. H, ch. II
(2015).
19. European Patent Convention art. 123(2), Oct. 5, 1973, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013/e/ar123.html [https://perma.cc/BSG2-BQKN].
20. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. H, ch. III, § 3;
see infra Section II.A.
21. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text for an explanation of prior art. See
infra note 57 for the statutory conditions of patentability.
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See infra Section II.D.2.
24. Aalt van de Kuilen, Successful European Oppositions: Analysis for the Patent Information Professional, 35 World Pat. Info. 126, 126 (2013).
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And about one third of opposed patents are amended during European opposition proceedings.25
Although the United States was previously reluctant to adopt a European-style mechanism for third parties to contest patent validity,26 resistance
has decreased over time. U.S. patent attorneys previously viewed European
opposition proceedings as antipatent, fearing that the proceedings resulted
in the harassment of patent owners27 and left the patent owners believing
that the proceedings were “time and money-consuming nonsense.”28 Nonetheless, Congress recognized that third parties, such as competitors, are
often in the best position to discover prior art that would invalidate a patent.
Consequently, Congress introduced ex parte reexamination proceedings in
1980 with the hope of strengthening the quality of U.S. patents.29 In 1999,
the United States introduced the inter partes reexamination proceeding to
permit some third-party participation in post-grant validity review of patents.30 After the introduction of patent reform legislation, including postgrant opposition proceedings in 2005,31 the 2011 AIA finally created the first
true U.S. patent opposition proceedings.
The new U.S. post-grant proceedings are popular32 and have been successful in providing a quick administrative alternative to litigation, but the
process of amending claims in these proceedings has been problematic. The
Board rarely grants motions to amend in U.S. post-grant proceedings.33 This
limited opportunity for amendment stands in contrast with the historic balance between patent claim vitality and the opportunity to amend claims.
25. Id.; Stephen G. Kunin, EPO Opposition Procedures, a Model for Post-Grant Review?,
Patent Post-Grant (Mar. 7, 2010), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/epo-opposition-procedures-a-comparison-with-inter-partes-reexamination-in-the-uspto [https://perma.cc/WY249HAA].
26. The third parties that are typically involved in post-grant patent validity proceedings
are competitors. Competitors are often eager to invalidate patents, for example, to avoid patent
infringement litigation.
27. See Robert B. Benson, The New Reexamination Law—A Legislative History, 9 APLA
Q.J. 227, 230–31 (1981); see also Harold C. Wegner, Patent Law Simplification and the Geneva
Patent Convention, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 154, 201 (1986) (discussing a concern with harassment
based on the results of the German opposition system).
28. Michael N. Meller, Opposition of Patents Under the EPC, 61 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 550,
556–57 (1979); see Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 107 (1997) (discussing the
opinion that post-grant opposition proceedings can create the opportunity for undue delay).
29. See Jeffrey P. Kushan, The Fruits of the Convoluted Road to Patent Reform: The New
Invalidity Proceedings of the Patent and Trademark Office, 30 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 385, 391
(2012); see also Christopher L. Logan, Patent Reform 2005: HR 2795 and the Road to Post-Grant
Oppositions, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 975, 988 (2006).
30. Logan, supra note 29, at 989. See infra text accompanying notes 73–78 for a discussion of inter partes reexamination.
31. Logan, supra note 29, at 975.
32. David C. Berry, USPTO Reports Continued Popularity of Inter Partes Review Proceedings, PatLit (Jan. 28, 2014), http://patlit.blogspot.com/2014/01/uspto-reports-continued-popularity-of.html [https://perma.cc/ABH8-9H9W].
33. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the current amendment practice disserves the AIA goals of
strengthening patents and stimulating innovation, because it minimizes the
opportunity for patent owners to amend claims and discourages inventors
from disclosing inventions. European opposition proceedings are similar to
U.S. proceedings,34 and certain aspects of the European proceedings can
serve as a model for U.S. claim amendment practice in AIA post-grant
proceedings.
This Note contends that the United States could benefit from adopting
characteristics of European opposition proceedings, particularly a modified
auxiliary request process to increase the opportunity for U.S. patent holders
to amend patent claims. Part I provides a summary of patent claim amendment practice prior to the AIA and a background of the AIA’s enactment.
Part II compares several aspects of claim amendment practice in U.S. postgrant proceedings with the parallel practice in European opposition proceedings to demonstrate that European proceedings are significantly more
favorable to patent owners.35 Part III discusses flaws with the current U.S.
approach to claim amendments in AIA post-grant proceedings. Part IV analyzes the suitability of the European approach for the United States and proposes adoption of a European-like auxiliary request process for the
submission of claim amendments.
I. The Landscape of Patent Claim Amendments Leading up to
Enactment of the America Invents Act
Patent claim amendments are not new to the patent system. Prior to the
enactment of the AIA, patent owners could amend claims prior to grant of
the patent and in post-grant reissue and reexamination proceedings in the
USPTO.36 In contrast, patent owners are never permitted to amend patents
during litigation; courts hold that a patent is either invalid or “not invalid.”37
The AIA left untouched most of the opportunities for a patent owner to
amend claims, but it added new post-grant validity proceedings and a corresponding opportunity to amend.38 Thus, most of the proceedings discussed
below are still available. Section I.A provides an overview of opportunities to
amend patent claims prior to the enactment of the AIA and introduces the
new AIA post-grant patent-challenge proceedings. Section I.B reviews the
34. See infra Part II.
35. This Part will be particularly useful for practitioners, specifically, those who have had
minimal experience with the U.S. proceedings. It would be reasonable to expect the U.S. proceedings to mimic the long-standing European opposition practice, but as Part II will illuminate, the availability of claim amendment to save a patent is far more limited in the United
States.
36. See infra Section I.A.
37. Courts do not assess whether a patent is valid. A holding that a patent is “not invalid” means that the prior art on the current record does not establish invalidity, but leaves
open the possibility that new evidence could invalidate the patent. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg,
849 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (inter partes review); id. § 321 (post-grant review).
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legislative history and purpose of the AIA generally and the new post-grant
proceedings specifically.
A. Patent Claim Amendments Prior to the America Invents Act
Patent claims define a patent owner’s property right. The owner may
need to amend the claims throughout the life of a patent to avoid covering
newly discovered prior art.39 Prior art consists of references, including other
patents and patent applications, that may be used to determine the novelty
and nonobviousness of claimed subject matter in a patent or patent application.40 A patent “is the grant of a property right to the inventor” for a limited period of time.41 A patent owner has a monopoly over the invention, as
described by the patent claims, during the life of a patent.42 Thus, carefully
drafted patent claims are critical to a patent owner’s property right. Effective
patent claims provide the broadest coverage possible without covering the
prior art. In addition to claims, a patent also includes a summary of the
invention, a detailed description of the invention, and drawings when
appropriate.43
Inventors obtain patents through a process called “prosecution” at the
USPTO.44 The first step in securing a patent is to file a patent application in
the USPTO.45 The process continues with a “series of negotiations” between
the patent examiner, who is a technical expert, and the applicant.46 The process typically ends with the issuance of the patent or abandonment of the
application by the applicant.47 The scope of a patent application is effectively
frozen at the time of filing the application.48 Thus, a patent owner may not
39. See, e.g., Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(noting that the patent owner obtained a Reexamination Certificate after amending claims in
light of newly discovered prior art); cf. Erin Coe, Easier AIA Review Amendments Still May Not
Be Best Option, Law360 (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/694632/print?section
=ip [https://perma.cc/34JV-FDKX] (noting that amending claims is a “key tool” for saving
patents from invalidity challenges).
40. See Donald S. Chisum, Patent Law Digest § 5.03(1) (2015).
41. General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO (Oct. 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-2 [https://www.per
ma.cc/Z9LU-FQ9F].
42. Merges & Duffy, supra note 4, at 15, 26.
43. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 608.01(a) (9th ed. Rev. 07.2015, Nov.
2015) [hereinafter MPEP].
44. Id., supra note 4, at 51–52.
45. See id. at 51.
46. See id. at 52.
47. Id. at 53. Although prosecution can also end in a final rejection of the application by
the examiner, the applicant still has several opportunities to effectively continue prosecution.
Evert Uy Tu & Jeffrey A. Wolfson, USPTO’s Final Rejection of a Patent Isn’t So Final, Law360
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/468230/uspto-s-final-rejection-of-a-patentisn-t-so-final [https://perma.cc/J4KY-K4U2].
48. 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f) (2015) (“No amendment may introduce new matter into the
disclosure of an application.”).
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use amendment as a tool to expand patent rights to cover subsequent improvements.49 Amendments are nonetheless common throughout prosecution and the life of a patent.50
Amendment is a valuable tool for patent applicants and owners because
it allows them to refine the existing patent claims, reducing the chance of
subsequent invalidation by a court or the USPTO.51 Invalidation of patent
claims is undesirable because it potentially leaves an invention vulnerable to
copying by competitors.52 Prior to enactment of the AIA, patent owners
could amend claims during both prosecution and post-grant reissue and
reexamination proceedings.
The first opportunity for amendment occurs during prosecution, prior
to the grant of patent rights. Patent applicants often amend patent claims
during prosecution to respond to arguments by the patent examiner. Although patent applicants may amend claims relatively freely during prosecution, they may not add new matter.53 A prohibition against new matter in
claim amendments ensures that the applicant does not broaden the scope of
the invention or add new details after the filing date.54 Amendments during
prosecution are not subject to page limits55 or a limit on the number of
substitute claims.56 The burden of proof regarding the patentability57 of proposed claims is on the examiner rather than the applicant; the examiner
must show that the claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of evidence.58 During patent prosecution, examiners construe patent claims according to their broadest reasonable interpretation.59 The applicant’s ability
to amend justifies this policy.60 Given that inventors often file patent applications early in the life of a certain technology and that claims define the scope
of the property right, the USPTO wants to ensure when it grants a patent
49. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
50. Chisum, supra note 40, § 5411.10(5).
51. See Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 Harv.
J.L. & Tech. 77, 80 (2014) (stating that claims that are too broad or too narrow run the risk of
being invalidated).
52. Filing a new patent application is not an acceptable solution because an invention is
not protected until the date the patent application is granted.
53. 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f).
54. See In re Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 1204 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
55. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.121 (manner of making amendments in applications).
56. See generally id. (manner of making amendments in applications); see infra text accompanying notes 119–124.
57. The basic statutory conditions of patentability are utility, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012),
novelty, id. § 102, and nonobviousness, id. § 103.
58. MPEP, supra note 43 §§ 706, 707.07(d). This differs from the new post-grant proceedings, which require the patent owner to demonstrate that the proposed claims are patentable. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) (2015).
59. See infra notes 135–140 and accompanying text for a discussion of broadest reasonable interpretation.
60. MPEP, supra note 43 § 2111; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316–17
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
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that the grant is not so broad that it will cover unforeseeable technologies.61
Because of the patent owner’s desire to secure expansive claims and the
USPTO’s competing goal of strong claims that can withstand the prior art,
amendment is routine in prosecution.
After prosecution and after the USPTO issues the patent, a patent owner
may apply for reissue of the patent in the USPTO to correct a defect that will
or may result in invalidity.62 Although a patent owner may amend claims
during a reissue proceeding,63 the opportunity to amend by broadening the
claims is limited to the first two years after issuance.64 A patent owner may
amend by narrowing the scope of claims in a reissue proceeding at any time
during the life of a patent.65 Furthermore, any substantive claim amendment
only applies prospectively; remedies are limited against a party previously
engaged in activity that did not infringe the original claims.66
Claim amendments are also permissible in post-grant ex parte reexamination proceedings.67 Reexamination proceedings provide an opportunity
for the USPTO to reconsider the validity of the patent claims.68 Anyone can
request ex parte reexamination, including the patentee, the Director of the
USPTO, or a third party.69 The proceeding is similar to prosecution, however, in that participation during the proceeding is limited to the patent
examiner and the patent owner.70 Patent owners are permitted to propose
any amendment to the patent at issue, including adding new claims.71 But
unlike amendments proposed in reissue proceedings, amendments in ex
parte reexamination proceedings may never broaden the scope of a claim.72
Inter partes reexamination proceedings were available prior to the enactment of the AIA and provided an opportunity for patent owners to
amend claims.73 Inter partes reexamination proceedings were very similar to
ex parte reexamination with the exception of third-party participation. In
contrast to ex parte reexamination, patent owners could not request inter
partes reexamination.74 Third parties initiated inter partes reexamination
61. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“This approach serves the
public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader
scope than is justified.”).
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012); Chisum, supra note 40, § 15.01.
63. See 35 U.S.C. § 251(a).
64. Id. § 251(d).
65. See id. § 251(a).
66. See id. § 252 (2012); Chisum, supra note 40, § 15.05.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012).
68. Merges & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1039.
69. Id. at 1040–41.
70. Id. at 1041.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 305.
72. Id.
73. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006) (amended 2011) (describing the process of
petitioning for and conducting inter partes reexamination).
74. Eric J. Rogers, Ten Years of Inter Partes Patent Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical
View, 29 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 305, 311 (2013).
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and were permitted to participate throughout the proceeding.75 As in ex
parte reexamination proceedings, a patent owner could propose any amendment that did not broaden the scope of a claim.76 Criticism of reexamination
proceedings—including of the limited third-party involvement77 and the
bias in favor of the patent owner78—led to the creation of the new AIA postgrant proceedings.
The AIA eliminated inter partes reexamination proceedings and replaced them with two different types of administrative post-grant proceedings: post-grant review (“PGR”) and inter partes review (“IPR”).79 Although
the proceedings resemble pre-AIA inter partes reexamination, there are several differences. First, it is more difficult for a petitioner to make the necessary threshold showing to initiate an AIA post-grant proceeding than it was
to initiate a pre-AIA inter partes review.80 Second, the Board conducts the
new proceedings without any involvement of examiners.81 In contrast, patent examiners conducted inter partes reexamination proceedings, and the
proceedings were appealable to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the predecessor to the Board).82 Third, unlike inter partes examination, the new post-grant proceedings permit limited discovery.83 Finally,
although inter partes reexamination proceedings were not subject to a time
limit,84 the Board must complete AIA post-grant proceedings within twelve
months with the possibility of an extension upon a showing of good cause.85
IPRs and PGRs are similar, but they have two key differences: (1) timing
for a petitioner to file a request for the proceeding in the USPTO, and (2)
permissible subject matter of the proceeding. In sum, petitioners must file
PGRs earlier in the life of a patent than IPRs,86 and PGRs permit a broader
range of challenges to patentability than IPRs.87 Thus, patents are vulnerable
75. Id.
76. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
77. Logan, supra note 29, at 988.
78. Kushan, supra note 29, at 391.
79. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46–48 (2011).
80. Andrew S. Baluch et al., America Invents Act § 6.01[A] (2015 ed.). Institution
of an inter partes reexamination filed before September 16, 2011 required a showing of a
substantial new question of patentability. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (2006). The burden for the
AIA proceedings is higher. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314, 324 (2012).
81. Baluch, supra note 80, § 6.01[A]. See supra Introduction for a discussion of the
Board.
82. Baluch, supra note 80, § 6.01[A]. See supra Introduction.
83. Baluch, supra note 80, § 6.01[A] (explaining that inter partes reexamination proceedings were conducted without discovery).
84. Id.
85. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11) (2012).
86. PGRs can only be initiated within nine months of the grant of a patent, 35 U.S.C.
§ 321(c) (2012), while IPRs can be initiated after the later of (1) nine months after grant of the
patent, or (2) after the termination of any PGR that has been initiated, id. § 311(c).
87. PGRs can be used to invalidate a patent based on sections 101, 102, 103, and 112 of
the Patent Act. See id. § 321(b). IPRs are available on narrower grounds than PGRs and may
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to fewer challenges later in the patent term.88 This Note discusses IPRs and
PGRs together and collectively refers to them as “post-grant proceedings.”
The AIA provides for claim amendments in both IPR89 and PGR90 proceedings. Regarding claim amendments in IPRs, the AIA provides that:
(1) . . . During an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the
patent owner may file 1 motion to amend the patent in 1 or more of
the following ways:
(A) Cancel any challenged patent claim.
(B) For each challenged claim, propose a reasonable number of substitute claims.
(2) . . . Additional motions to amend may be permitted upon the joint
request of the petitioner and the patent owner to materially advance
the settlement of a proceeding under section 317, or as permitted by
regulations prescribed by the Director.
(3) . . . An amendment under this subsection may not enlarge the scope of
the claims of the patent or introduce new matter.91

The law for PGRs is similar, except that the second paragraph reads: “Additional motions to amend may be permitted upon the joint request of the
petitioner and the patent owner to materially advance the settlement . . . or
upon the request of the patent owner for good cause shown.”92 Aside from the
slight textual difference in the second paragraph of the statute above, the
text of the USPTO claim amendment rule is the same for both IPRs93 and
PGRs.94
B. Background and Legislative History of the America Invents Act
The AIA seeks to (1) stimulate innovation and (2) improve the quality
of America’s patents so that it can remain a key player in the (3) global
intellectual property market.95 First, the AIA’s Final House Committee report articulates a need for a patent system that “recognizes the importance
only be used to invalidate patents based on Sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act. Id.
§ 311(b).
88. For most patents, the term spans from the date the patent is granted to twenty years
from the filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
89. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d).
90. Id. § 326(d).
91. Id. § 316(d) (emphasis added).
92. Id. § 326(d)(2) (emphasis added). This difference in the statutory language may be
due to an increased willingness by Congress to allow amendment later in the life of a patent.
Because PGRs can only be instituted during the first nine months after the grant of a patent,
examination has only recently ended and it is less likely that a relevant piece of prior art was
unknown at the time of examination.
93. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 (2015).
94. Id. § 42.221.
95. In his signing statement, President Obama described the AIA as “a bill that cuts away
the redtape that slows down our inventors and entrepreneurs.” See Remarks on Signing the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 1, at 2.
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of quiet title to patent owners to ensure continued investment resources.”96
One way to incentivize innovation is to reduce unwarranted litigation
costs.97 This goal addresses the recent problem of abuse of litigation by nonpracticing entities.98 For example, litigation takes time and money away
from innovation. Second, the AIA’s legislative history highlights the overarching goal of strengthening America’s patents.99 Strengthening our pool of
patents involves both eliminating bad patents and upholding and fine-tuning valid patents. Third, the AIA seeks to “harmoniz[e] our system . . . with
. . . other major patent systems throughout the industrialized world.”100 Each
of the significant changes accompanying the AIA works toward these
goals.101 Although Congress modified many of the AIA’s provisions during
the six years of legislative history that led up to its enactment, the text related to the new post-grant proceedings remained substantively
unchanged.102
The AIA’s legislative history suggests that the new post-grant proceedings must balance the goal of enabling early challenges to patents with protection of inventors and patent holders.103 Failing to shield inventors from
abuse of these new proceedings “would frustrate the purpose of the section
. . . [and] such activity would divert resources from the research and development of inventions.”104 The House Committee on the Judiciary believed
that the new post-grant proceedings would improve the quality of both patents and the patent system as a whole.105 Furthermore, the improved quality
would presumably “restore confidence in the presumption of validity that
comes with issued patents in court.”106
96. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40, 48 (2011).
97. Id. at 40 (discussing the need to reduce the cost of unnecessary litigation).
98. See De Corte et al., supra note 6, at 94.
99. E.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 39 (“The voices heard during the debate over changes
to the patent law . . . . have focused the Committee’s attention on the value of . . . improving
patent quality . . . .”); 157 Cong. Rec. S5354 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2011) (“[T]o increase the
quality and certainty of patent rights . . . the Administration . . . supports provisions . . . that
would enhance the opportunities for post-grant review of patents by the USPTO.”); 157
Cong. Rec. H4389 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Schiff) (“I have long supported
fundamental reforms to our patent system that would . . . increase the quality of patents
. . . .”).
100. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40.
101. Major changes introduced by the AIA include: a transition from a “first-to-invent” to
a “first-to-file” system; expansion of the parties that may apply for patents to include assignees; introduction of new post-grant administrative proceedings; expanded prior-user rights;
and USPTO fee setting. Summary of the America Invents Act, AIPLA, http://www.aipla.org/
advocacy/congress/aia/Pages/summary.aspx [https://perma.cc/AXQ8-92G2].
102. See generally Matal, supra note 1; Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the
America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 539 (2012).
103. H.R. Rep. 112-98, pt. 1, at 47–48.
104. Id. at 48.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Although the new post-grant proceedings seem to favor petitioners at
the expense of patent holders,107 the AIA is a step in the right direction
toward improving U.S. patent law. It provides a mechanism to eliminate bad
patents, reduces the time and cost of contesting patent validity, and achieves
greater uniformity with the other patent systems of the world. Nonetheless,
the proceedings do not fully serve the AIA goal of strengthening patents that
encourage innovation. The USPTO rules explicitly add requirements to the
amendment of claims beyond the requirements of the AIA.108 Furthermore,
the Board employs a strict interpretation of the AIA and USPTO rules, often
reading in additional hurdles beyond what is textually obvious, particularly
with respect to the evidentiary burden on patent owners in showing the
patentability of proposed claim amendments.109
II. A Comparison of Claim Amendments in Post-Grant Patent
Validity Proceedings in Europe and the United States
Although the new U.S. post-grant proceedings are distinct from other
foreign post-grant opposition proceedings, the European opposition practice may serve as a useful model for claim amendment practice in U.S. proceedings. The following four Sections will compare post-AIA claim
amendment practice in the U.S. proceedings with the parallel practice in
European opposition proceedings.110 Section II.A compares limitations on
the number of amendments and the number of proposed new claims in the
two systems. Section II.B discusses claim construction standards in the
United States and Europe. Section II.C highlights the evidentiary burden in
each system. Section II.D discusses procedural differences between the proceedings in the United States and Europe and a willingness of the USPTO to
respond to criticism.

107. Pardon & Brunner, supra note 2, at 10 (“The post-grant review procedure has several
advantages for a potential patent challenger.”); Scott A. McKeown, Improving PTAB Motion to
Amend Practice, Pats. Post-Grant (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptabmotions-to-amend [https://perma.cc/37LS-APPT] (“[T]he Board is being criticized as antipatent.”).
108. The most significant of these nonstatutory requirements are: the number of allowable substitute claims, see infra Section II.A, and the broadest reasonable interpretation standard for claim interpretation, see infra Section II.B.
109. See infra Section II.C.
110. Although European opposition proceedings are more similar to U.S. PGRs than
IPRs, most of the discussion in this Section will focus on analysis of recent IPRs. As of June
2015, only two post-grant review trials were instituted, and none of them were completed,
thus, data is extremely limited. USPTO, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics 11 (2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-06-30%20PTAB.pdf [https://perma
.cc/SE69-N483]. Because the two processes are “governed by substantially similar provisions,”
David R. Gerk & John M. Fleming, New Practitioner’s Guide to Intellectual Property 58–59 (2012), the analysis contained herein should be not be substantively affected by
this substitution.
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A. Patent Owners in the United States Have a More Limited Opportunity
to Amend Patent Claims in Post-Grant Proceedings than Patent
Owners in European Opposition Proceedings
The opportunity to amend patent claims in post-grant proceedings is
far more limited in the United States than in Europe. The ability to amend is
important to patent holders because it allows refinement of claims as an
alternative to invalidation. The extent of opportunity to amend in U.S. postgrant proceedings is controlled in two ways: (1) limiting the number of motions to amend that a patent holder may file, and (2) limiting the number of
proposed substitute claims in a motion to amend.111 These limitations truncate the negotiation that is typically involved in refining claim language.112
Neither of the two U.S. limitations on the extent of the opportunity to
amend is present in European proceedings. In contrast to U.S. post-grant
proceedings, European opposition proceedings were not a reactionary creation and do not burden the proceedings with a time limit. Thus, while one
unsuccessful set of amended claims in the United States will likely result in
invalidation of some claims or the entire patent, it is merely the start of a
dialogue in Europe. A comparison of the opportunity to amend in each
system highlights the different approaches that resulted from divergent goals
for the proceedings.
The Board has been strict in its treatment of the number of allowable
motions to amend. The AIA states that patent holders may file one motion
to amend in IPRs and contemplates the possibility of additional amendments.113 The Board explained that Congress “did not intend that [the] opportunity to [amend claims] be unfettered.”114 Although the USPTO rules
provide for the opportunity to file additional motions to amend upon a
showing of good cause or “a joint request of the petitioner and the patent
owner to materially advance a settlement,”115 such motions are rarely
allowed.116 The USPTO occasionally permits additional motions when the

111. Limitation (1) deals with the total number of motions that may be filed, while limitation (2) is about the number of claims in one motion.
112. See supra text accompanying note 46.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012).
114. Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL 8705538
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).
115. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 (2015); see 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(2) (2012).
116. See Toyota Motor Corp. v. Am. Vehicular Scis. LLC, No. IPR2013-00415, 2014 WL
2895813 (P.T.A.B. June 26, 2014) (“There would be no end to this proceeding if the Patent
Owner is permitted to keep filing further proposed amendments on the contingency that the
Board concludes in favor of the Petitioner with regard to an earlier Motion to Amend claims
. . . . A Patent Owner has no right to file a second Motion to Amend Claims.”); Jonathan
Tamimi, Note, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive Resolution of Patent
Validity, 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 587, 637 (2014).
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patent owner overlooks ambiguous procedural requirements,117 but it never
allows additional motions to amend simply to further narrow the claims.118
The U.S. restriction on the number of substitute claims demonstrates
the Board’s tendency to exceed the AIA in its treatment of claim amendments. The AIA permits the patent owner to “propose a reasonable number
of substitute claims” in a motion to amend.119 The USPTO rule limits the
meaning of the term “reasonable number,” stating that “[t]he presumption
is that only one substitute claim would be needed to replace each challenged
claim, and it may be rebutted by a demonstration of need.”120 The Board
will evaluate whether the moving party has demonstrated need on a per
claim basis, given that “[c]ompliance is not achieved merely by maintaining
the same total number of claims before and after the amendment.”121 The
one-to-one assumption has challenged patent owners. For example, in REG
Synthetic Fuels, LLC v. Neste Oil Oyj, the Board pointed to the requirement
for a reasonable number of substitute claims in denying the patent holder’s
motion to amend.122 In that case, the patent owner proposed two substitute
claims to replace four original claims.123 The Board reasoned that the first
substitute claim correlated to all four original claims, the second substitute
claim was not distinct from the first one, and therefore, they were both considered substitutes for the original group of four claims.124 The one-to-one
assumption for the number of substitute claims demonstrates the Board’s
harsh treatment of claim amendments.
Claim amendments in European opposition proceedings are not subject
to either of the two limitations discussed above with respect to U.S. proceedings, and therefore European patent holders have a much greater opportunity to amend claims. The European implementing regulation does not place
a limit on the number of proposed amendments.125 The regulation permits
patent owners to submit a main request or one or more auxiliary requests.126
117. See, e.g., Idle Free, 2013 WL 8705538 (permitting the patent owner to file another
motion to amend when the patent owner failed to confer with the Board prior to filing the
first motion).
118. The patent owner in Idle Free proposed ten substitute claims in place of challenged
claim 1 and thirteen substitute claims for challenged claim 17, hoping to have “multiple
backup positions on an incremental basis, in case any substitute claim [was] proven unpatentable.” Id. at 11. The Board dismissed the motion, stating that “a general and common desire
[is] insufficient to constitute [a] necessary special circumstance.” Id.
119. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
120. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3) (emphasis added).
121. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc., No. IPR2014-00441,
2014 WL 5477766 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2014).
122. No. IPR2013-00178, 2014 WL 4348181, at *5, *13 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2014).
123. REG Synthetic Fuels, 2014 WL 4348181, at *5.
124. Id. (stating that both substitute claims 21 and 30 could be considered replacements
for original claim 1, and therefore, the motion is in violation of the one-to-one presumption).
125. See Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. H, ch. III,
§ 3 (2015).
126. Id.
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A main request is commonly a request that the patent be maintained as
granted without amendment.127 Auxiliary requests present various amendments to claims, typically narrowing in scope with each subsequent request.128 Each auxiliary request in a European proceeding is analogous to
one motion to amend in the United States. The European practice sharply
contrasts with the U.S. approach, wherein a patent owner may only submit
one set of proposed amended claims at a time.129 The opposition division of
the European Patent Office—which usually consists of three technical Examiners130—begins with the main request, considers each request in order, and
allows the broadest claim possible in light of the evidence uncovered during
the proceedings.131 It is not uncommon for a European patent holder to file
ten or more auxiliary requests.132 This process can be described as “a negotiation between the parties, with the [opposition division] serving as mediator.”133 Like its approach to the number of sets of proposed claims, Europe’s
approach to allowable number of proposed amended claims per original
claim is also flexible. Europe’s use of the auxiliary request process and nonlimiting approach to the number of claims result in a greater ease of amendment in European opposition proceedings than in U.S. post-grant
proceedings.
B.

The Claim Construction Standard in the United States Is More Likely to
Result in Invalidation of Patent Claims
than the European Standard

The claim construction standard in the U.S. post-grant proceedings is
different from the standard used in U.S. litigation, while the European standard mirrors the standard used in European litigation. Because claim construction is often decisive in a patentability analysis,134 the difference in
standards in the United States can lead to inconsistent results in different
forums.
127. See Andreas Grubert, Understanding European Patent Opposition in Light of US Patent
Practice, IP Litigator, May/June 2005, at 8, 15.
128. See Chris Hamer & David Miller, Claim Requests, and Other EPO Pitfalls, 226 Managing Intell. Prop., Feb. 2013, at 44.
129. See Grubert, supra note 127, at 9, 15.
130. Grubert, supra note 127, at 12.
131. See Gerald Paterson, The European Patent System 242 (2d ed. 2001).
132. See Hamer & Miller, supra note 128, at 45–46 (discussing cases such as Vectura and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., in which the patent holders each filed at least fifteen auxiliary requests).
133. Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve
Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents 7 (2006), http://www
.sfbtr15.de/uploads/media/38.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS3D-K3VB].
134. Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L.
Rev. 215, 219 (2008). For example, a claim that is construed narrowly is less likely to encroach
upon prior art, and is therefore more likely to be patentable.

June 2016]

Improving Patent Quality

1513

Figure 1 illustrates that a broader interpretation of a patent claim is
more likely to “read on” the prior art than a narrower interpretation.135 “A
claim ‘reads on’ or covers products or processes that contain all of the elements and limitations of the claim.”136 Claims that read on prior art are
invalid.137 Thus, a court may uphold a claim under a narrow interpretation
where the Board would invalidate the claim under a broader interpretation.
The claim construction standard in U.S. proceedings is more likely to result
in invalidation of patent claims than the European claim construction standard because of the broader claim construction standard.
Figure 1
Claim Construction Example138

The standard for claim construction in U.S. post-grant proceedings differs from the standard litigants use in U.S. district courts. Therefore,
whether a U.S. patent claim is valid may turn on whether the USPTO or a
court is construing the claim. The USPTO uses a “broadest reasonable construction” standard for all purposes, including in post-grant proceedings
and examination.139 This standard requires claims to be “interpreted as
135. For example, a patent claim states that a table leg has a “generally circular cross
section.” The prior art includes a table leg with an elliptical cross section. The broadest reasonable interpretation of “generally circular” could be found to encompass elliptical and therefore
read on the prior art. In contrast, the plain and ordinary meaning of “generally circular”
probably does not include elliptical, and thus the claim would not read on the prior art under
the litigation standard.
136. Chisum, supra note 40, Glossary Patent Terms. That is, the patent claim encroaches
upon prior art.
137. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
138. Note that different claim construction standards will not always lead to different
results. There may be situations in which both the broad interpretation and the narrow
interpretation intersect with the prior art, or when neither the broad interpretation nor the
narrow interpretation intersects with the prior art.
139. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Inter Partes Review, 37
C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2015); Post-Grant Review, 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). It should be noted that
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broadly as their terms reasonably allow.”140 As Figure 1 demonstrates, the
broadest reasonable interpretation standard yields a higher chance of invalidation based on the amount of overlap with the prior art.
The USPTO’s broadest reasonable interpretation standard contrasts
with federal courts’ plain and ordinary meaning standard. The plain and
ordinary meaning standard begins with an objective, baseline inquiry of how
a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the claim terms
at the time of invention.141 A court determines the ordinary meaning of a
claim term by reviewing the patent specification, the other claims, the prosecution history, the prior art cited during prosecution, and relevant extrinsic
evidence.142 The analysis focuses mainly on intrinsic evidence and is narrower than the broadest reasonable interpretation standard used by the
USPTO. This difference in claim construction standards suggests that a patent claim is more likely to be invalidated in an AIA post-grant proceeding
than in litigation.
The standard for claim construction in European opposition proceedings parallels the standard used in European courts,143 so claim construction
of a European patent is less likely to turn on forum than in the United
States. The European Patent Office interprets claims according to the normal
meaning in the relevant art unless otherwise provided in the patent description.144 Like the plain and ordinary meaning standard that U.S. courts use,
the inquiry turns on what the claim language would mean to a technical
expert rather than to a layperson.145 Unlike in the United States, European
patent claims are construed according to the same standard by courts and
the European Patent Office.146 Thus, the likelihood of invalidity based on
claim construction in Europe does not turn on forum.

the USPTO modified the rule to provide an exception for patents that will expire prior to the
issuance of a final decision in an IPR or PGR. Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100, 42.200 (2016) [hereinafter 2016
USPTO Amendments]. Comments for this proposed rule were due on November 18, 2015.
PTAB Extends Time for Comments on Proposed Rules, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patentsapplication-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/about-ptab/ptab-extends-time-comments
[https://perma.cc/RD5V-U2XG].
140. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
141. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
142. Id. at 1317.
143. Kevin Greenleaf et al., Beyond Our Borders: Comparing the Opposition Proceedings of
Europe, China, and the United States, Landslide, July/August 2013, at 36, 38.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Id.
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C. Patent Owners in U.S. Post-Grant Proceedings Are Subject to a More
Onerous Evidentiary Burden than Patent Owners
in European Opposition Proceedings
The evidentiary burden in U.S. proceedings is far more onerous than in
European proceedings as a result of the divergent approaches to the burden
of showing the patentability or unpatentability of the proposed amended
claims. Patent owners in the United States are required to show the patentability of proposed amended claims over art cited in the proceeding, art cited
during prosecution and other proceedings, and any other art known to the
patent owner.147 This requirement is burdensome because it is difficult for
patent owners to anticipate the relevant arguments.148 The petitioner may
respond to the patent owner’s motion and may introduce additional prior
art. Because patent owners typically do not receive a second chance to
amend, the only opportunity to defend proposed claims is in the initial motion to amend.149
These procedures create an imbalance between a patent owner’s opportunity to defend its proposed claims and the petitioner’s opportunity to attack the proposed claims. They lead to a very limited opportunity for
amendment. In contrast, the evidentiary burden in European proceedings is
more balanced between the parties. Because invalidating prior art is limited
to art that the parties have cited in the proceeding, the patent owner is on
notice about how to prepare the best amendments early on. The European
approach favors notice and fairness to both parties through transparency in
the prior art at issue in the proceeding, while the U.S. approach is stacked
against the patent owner because of the patent owner’s limited opportunity
to defend proposed claims.
The USPTO rule for evidentiary burden goes beyond what is statutorily
mandated and dictates the unusually high evidentiary burden for patent
owners in U.S. post-grant proceedings. For example, the Patent Act150 requires parties other than the patent owner—the examiner in the case of
prosecution151 and the opposing party in the case of litigation152—to prove
that a claim is unpatentable. In contrast, the AIA is silent with respect to

147. See MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. Reald Inc., No. IPR2015-00040, 2015 WL 4383224
(P.T.A.B. July 15, 2015).
148. See Coe, supra note 39 (noting that a patent owner must propose amendments before
knowing how the Board will rule on its original claims).
149. See Coe, supra note 39 (“Until the PTAB starts granting more motions to amend,
patent owners are going to continue to have a perception that amendment motions will only
be allowed in rare circumstances . . . .”).
150. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2012).
151. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1964)).
152. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
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placement of the burden for proposed amended claims in post-grant proceedings.153 Thus, the placement of the burden on the patent holder to show
patentability of proposed amended claims comes from the USPTO rule,
which states that “[t]he moving party has the burden of proof to establish
that it is entitled to the requested relief.”154 In the case of a motion to
amend, the patent owner is the moving party, and the requested relief is that
the proposed claim amendments be entered.
The Board commonly denies motions to amend for failure to meet this
high evidentiary burden, and it has elaborated on expectations as to what
information is necessary to show patentability in its written decisions. It
interprets the rule as requiring the patent owner to show patentable distinction over both the prior art of record in the proceeding and any other prior
art known to the patent owner.155 Furthermore, the Board has also required
patent owners to “present evidence . . . as to the level of ordinary skill in the
art.”156 For example, in Intellectual Ventures Management, LLC v. Xilinx, Inc.,
the Board ultimately denied the motion to amend for failure to explain why
a person skilled in the art “would not have found the proposed substitute
claims obvious.”157 In Scentair Technologies v. Prolitec, the Board denied the
patent owner’s motion to amend for failure to distinguish the proposed
amended claims over art cited in the original prosecution.158 The Board recently attempted to clarify the burden by stating that “ ‘prior art known to
the patent owner’ . . . should be understood as no more than the material
prior art that [the] [p]atent [o]wner makes of record in the current proceeding pursuant to its duty of candor and good faith to the Office,”159 but patent practitioners remain concerned about the hurdle presented by this
requirement.160
Successful motions to amend in post-grant proceedings are rare and
have been accompanied by large bodies of evidence of patentability. For example, in International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. United States, in addition
to simply responding to the petitioner’s original claims of unpatentability,
the patent owner demonstrated the level of ordinary skill in the art by producing expert testimony and several other scientific publications.161 In the
153. See id. § 316(e). The statute states that “[i]n an inter partes review instituted under
this chapter, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by
a preponderance of the evidence” Id. (emphasis added). While this standard clearly applies to
challenged original claims, it is unclear whether it also applies to proposed amended claims.
154. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) (2015).
155. Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL 8705538
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).
156. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. United States, No. IPR2013-00124, 2014 WL
2120542, at *5 (P.T.A.B. May 20, 2014).
157. No. IPR2012-00018, 2014 WL 574597, at *22 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2014).
158. No. IPR2013-00179 (P.T.A.B. June 26, 2014).
159. MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. Reald Inc., No. IPR2015-00040, 2015 WL 4383224 (P.T.A.B.
July 15, 2015).
160. See Coe, supra note 39.
161. No. IPR2013-00124, 2014 WL 2120542, at *6.
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Riverbed Technology, Inc., v. Silver Peak Systems, Inc. cases,162 the patent
owner met its burden of showing patentability over the prior art “by providing a ‘story’ of what the prior taught, citing to both art of record and otherwise, and explaining why its proposed substitute claims described ‘a very
different approach.’ ”163 These successful motions can serve as models for
U.S. practitioners in preparing motions to amend, but they do not ultimately decrease the evidentiary burden.
A patent owner’s burden in distinguishing prior art in a European opposition proceeding is lower when compared to the burden a U.S. patent
holder faces during an IPR or a PGR. A patent owner may present expert
witness testimony but is not required to do so.164 The European rules impose
no requirement of presenting the level of ordinary skill in the art.165 The
proceedings are conducted around prior art cited by the party that brought
the action,166 as well as any prior art that the opposition division uncovers.167
Unlike in the United States, if a party presents new evidence during an opposition, the parties can request a break or postponement.168 European opposition proceedings are conducted with an “inherently strong presumption
of validity.”169 The European evidentiary burden is less onerous than the
burden in U.S. post-grant proceedings, and it contributes to the relative ease
of claim amendments in European proceedings.
D. U.S. Procedural Requirements Are More Burdensome than European
Procedural Requirements
The USPTO’s recent modification of its procedural rules regarding postgrant proceedings demonstrates its willingness to adapt to criticism by practitioners. The recent amendments provide relief from previously demanding
procedural hurdles and bring the U.S. approach closer to the flexible European approach. The challenges facing a patent holder in U.S. proceedings
162. No. IPR2013-00402, 2014 WL 7405745 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2014); No. IPR201300403, 2014 WL 7405746 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2014).
163. Andrew Williams, PTAB Update—The Board Grants Its Second Motion to Amend (At
Least in Part), Patent Docs (Jan. 8, 2015, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/01/
ptab-update-the-board-grants-its-second-motion-to-amend-at-least-in-part.html [https://per
ma.cc/YER9-84GJ].
164. See Grubert, supra note 127, at 12.
165. See generally European Patent Convention, supra note 19, art. 100; id. r. 80; Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. H, ch. III, § 3.
166. See Paterson, supra note 131, at 109.
167. See C. H. Beck et al., Patent Law: A Handbook on European & German Patent
Law 520 (Maximilian Haedicke & Henrik Timmann eds., 2014). However, “[t]he Opposition
Division generally does not conduct an additional search for the state of the art as this search
is already conducted during the examination procedure and the opponents have often conducted their own searches as well.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
168. David Lethem, Opposition Proceedings at the EPO: Tips for Success, in Patent Practice in Japan & Europe 145, 148 (Bernd Hansen & Dirk Schüssler-Langeheine eds., 2011).
169. Grubert, supra note 127, at 16.
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include a mandatory conference with the Board prior to filing the motion,170
a limited timeframe for filing the motion,171 and limitations on the length
and format of the motion.172 Decisions from early IPRs revealed an inflexible
approach to these requirements that often resulted in denials of motions to
amend without substantive consideration.173 The U.S. procedural requirements, however, have been less burdensome because of clarification by the
Board174 and the amended USPTO rules.175 In contrast, the European Patent
Office is generally more lenient on procedural issues and clearly defines all
requirements in the implementing regulations and the Guidelines for Examination.176 This Section will analyze how the U.S. procedural rules have
evolved during the first three years of post-grant proceedings and compare
the U.S. and European requirements.
1. Mandatory Conference with the Board
Recent proceedings have both clarified and relaxed the U.S. requirement
for a patent owner to confer with the Board prior to filing a motion to
amend,177 bringing the U.S. practice closer in line with the European practice. The Board justified the U.S. requirement to confer by stating that the
procedure “enhances efficiency by saving the patent owner’s time and resources to prepare a motion that would otherwise be denied because of certain reasons.”178 Although the requirement to confer has merit, the lack of
clarity of expectations resulted in seemingly arbitrary denials of motions to
170. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a) (2015).
171. Id. § 42.121(a)(1) (“Unless a due date is provided in a Board order, a motion to
amend must be filed no later than the filing of a patent owner response.”). “[T]he default date
for filing a patent owner response is three months from the date the [IPR] was instituted.” Id.
§ 42.120(b).
172. See id. § 42.24(a).
173. Even the seemingly straightforward requirements have presented challenges to patent
holders. See Blackberry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas LLC, No. IPR2013-00016, 2014 WL
824372, at *11 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2014) (stating that an attempt by the patent owner to incorporate expert testimony by reference was a violation of the page limit); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. IPR2012-00042, 2013 WL 8705576 (P.T.A.B. June 28, 2013) (denying
a motion to amend without prejudice for failure to comply with fifteen-page limit); cf. Xilinx,
Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, No. IPR2013-00029, 2013 WL 8705694 (P.T.A.B. June 25,
2013) (reminding the parties about the 14-point font rule in the context of a rehearing request). For example, both offices require the patent owner to point to support in the original
disclosure for the proposed amendment, as no new matter may be added. European Patent
Convention, supra note 19, art. 123(2).
174. See, e.g., infra Section II.D.1.
175. See, e.g., infra Section II.D.3.
176. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 19, r. 80; Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office. For example, the European guidelines provide examples of specific wording that may be used in auxiliary requests (emphasis added). Id., pt. H,
ch. III, § 3.
177. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a) (2015).
178. Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, 2013 WL 8352845, at *1
(P.T.A.B. June 3, 2013).
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amend in early proceedings.179 The Board has since clarified and relaxed the
requirement, even accepting a motion to amend when the conference call
was requested “a mere two business days prior to the due date of [the motion],”180 and it has been less burdensome for patent owners.
The European opposition claim amendment practice omits a requirement to confer entirely. Unlike in the United States, a European patent
owner may file amendments any time after the opposition is accepted as a
matter of right.181 The expansive opportunity for amendment in European
opposition proceedings eliminates the necessity of a premotion conference
because a patent holder who is unsuccessful in a main request for amendment may rely on an auxiliary request or new amendment. Although the
USPTO did not eliminate the requirement to confer in its recent amendments, its recent decisions demonstrate that it is willing to take a more flexible approach to consideration of an amendment, as in Europe.
2. Timing
In U.S. proceedings, the Board is statutorily obligated to complete postgrant proceedings in twelve months.182 This results in strict deadlines that
restrict administrative modification of time limits.183 Specifically, motions to
amend in U.S. proceedings are due no later than the patent owner’s response
after initiation of the proceeding.184 This time limit requires the patent
owner to propose claim amendments before knowing how the Board will
rule on the validity of the claims at issue.185

179. Compare Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL
8705538 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013) (denying the patent owner’s motion to amend prior to
substantive consideration after the patent owner generally discussed intent to file a motion to
amend during the initial conference call), with Nichia, 2013 WL 8352845, at *1 (granting the
patent owner’s motion to amend after discussing amendment in the initial conference call).
180. See MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. Reald Inc., No. IPR2015-00040, 2015 WL 4383224, at 2
(P.T.A.B. July 15, 2015) (accepting the motion, but noting that such conference calls are preferably requested at least ten days prior to the due date of the motion).
181. Alan MacDougall & Chris Hamer, Opposition at the European Patent Office, in The
Handbook of European Intellectual Property Management ch. 11.3 (Adam Jolly &
Jeremy Philpott eds., 2007) (ebook).
182. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11) (2012).
183. See De Corte et al., supra note 6, at 124 (describing U.S. deadlines as aggressive); see
also Lawrence Stahl & Donald Heckenberg, The Limited Ability of a Patent Owner to Amend
Claims and Present New Claims in Post-Grant and Inter Partes Reviews, Fitzpatrick, Cella,
Harper & Scinto’s Patent Prosecution Update 4 (May 2012), http://www.fitzpatrickcella
.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/Fitz_PTO_1_5_8.pdf [https://perma.cc/28CH-WQL3]
(describing the time frame for filing amendments in PGRs and IPRs as limited when compared to inter partes reexamination proceedings).
184. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(1) (2015).
185. Coe, supra note 39.
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In contrast to the U.S. approach, the European Patent Office employs a
more flexible timeline186 and often accepts late amendments.187 The European Patent Office prefers to conduct substantive examinations over observing rigid timelines,188 and it believes in each party’s right to be heard.189 As
such, Europe’s policy produces proceedings that generally last much longer
than twelve months,190 but it may also result in patent claims that are more
finely tuned.
3. Page Length
Although the original USPTO rule regarding page limits was restrictive
and presented a challenge to patent owners, the USPTO recently amended
the rule to increase the page limit and permit the placement of certain items
in an appendix.191 The original U.S. rule limited the length of motions to
amend to fifteen double-spaced pages.192 Application of the rule was generally strict; for example, in Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., the Board
dismissed a motion where the patent holder included a claim listing as an
appendix, citing a violation of the page limit.193 However, the USPTO relaxed the page limit in response to widespread criticism of the restriction on
page limits by patent practitioners.194 In contrast to the U.S. rule, there is no
186. Haitao Sun, Note, Post-Grant Patent Invalidation in China and in the United States,
Europe, and Japan: A Comparative Study, 15 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 273,
306 (2004); see Kunin, supra note 25.
187. M. Trinidad Arriola, Key Features of the European Patent Office (EPO) Opposition
Procedures, Ctr. for Advanced Study & Res. on Innovation Pol’y Newsl. (Univ. of Wash.
Sch. of Law, Seattle, Wash.), Spring/Summer 1997, http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/
Newsletter/default.aspx?year=1997&article=newsv4i2eu1 [https://perma.cc/D3FK-EHLB].
188. Ian Muir et al., European Patent Law 244 (2d ed. 2002).
189. Beck et al., supra note 167, at 527.
190. See, e.g., Sun, supra note 186, at 308; Greenleaf et al., supra note 143, at 40; Bronwyn
H. Hall et al., Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-Grant Opposition 10 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9731, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9731
[https://perma.cc/BL5P-RS3C].
191. Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 28562 (May 19, 2015) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1), (c)(2)) [hereinafter May 2015 USPTO Amendments] (increasing the page limit by ten pages and allowing
proposed claims to be presented in an appendix).
192. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(v) (2014).
193. No. IPR2012-00042, 2013 WL 8705576 (P.T.A.B. June 28, 2013). But see Corning
Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc., No. IPR 2014-00441, 2014 WL 5477766
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2014) (authorizing the patent owner to place proposed substitute claims in
an appendix that did not count toward the page limit).
194. See, e.g., Jamie D. Choi et al., Amending Claims During Inter Partes Review: Patent
Practitioners Beware, Jones Day (Aug. 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/amending-claims-during-inter-partes-review-patent-practitioners-beware-08-05-2014/ [https://perma.cc/5QKE4QTP]; Azy Kokabi, PTAB Limits Claim Amendment in Inter Partes Review, Sughrue Blog
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.sughrue.com/en-US/resources/PublicationDetail.aspx?publica
tion=111aef5c-b38e-40ee-a7c5-41c985f76fa3 [https://perma.cc/J25M-57MD]; McKeown,
supra note 107.
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specific page limit in Europe.195 The new U.S. rule brings U.S. practice closer
to European practice and is more favorable to patent owners than the original rule because it reduces the challenge of meeting the high evidentiary
burden196 within limited space.
The evolution of U.S. procedural rules during the first three years of
AIA post-grant proceedings demonstrates a willingness of the USPTO to
respond to criticism about the proceedings. Through its written opinions,
the Board relaxed the requirement to confer prior to filing a motion to
amend. The USPTO modified page limits through an amendment to its
rules. These modifications of procedural rules and practice show that change
is feasible in AIA post-grant proceedings.
III. Something Needs to Change: Why the U.S. Approach
Is Not Working
The U.S. approach to claim amendments in AIA post-grant proceedings
is not working because it creates an imbalance between claim vitality and
opportunity to amend, and it fails to achieve the goals of the AIA. The combination of the broadest reasonable claim construction standard and limited
opportunity for amendment in U.S. proceedings works against patent owners and is contrary to the balance Congress struck in other USPTO proceedings and U.S. district court litigation. Furthermore, the legislative history of
the AIA supports a change in U.S. post-grant amendment practice because
expanding the opportunity for amendment would fine-tune patents. Continuing with the current harsh practice creates a danger of discouraging inventors to disclose inventions in patents. Section III.A reviews the historic
balance between patent claim vitality and the extent of the opportunity to
amend and concludes that the current practice upsets this balance. Section
III.B argues that reducing the difficulty of amendment in AIA post-grant
proceedings would serve the goals of the AIA.
A. Balancing Ease of Claim Invalidation with Opportunity for Amendment
Pre-AIA patent proceedings in U.S. district courts and the USPTO
demonstrate that Congress struck a balance between the vitality of claims
and the extent of opportunity to amend claims, and the current practice in
USPTO post-grant proceedings diverges from that historic balance. Table 1
depicts characteristics contributing to this balance for (a) U.S. district court
litigation, (b) USPTO examination proceedings, and (c) AIA post-grant proceedings. A “(+)” in Table 1 indicates that the characteristic is relatively
more favorable to the patent owner, and a “(–)” indicates that the characteristic is relatively more favorable to the challenger or patent examiner. Rows
(i)–(iii) of Table 1 summarize characteristics that contribute to the vitality of

195. Greenleaf et al., supra note 143, at 37.
196. See supra Section II.C.
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patent claims, that is, the difficulty of invalidating claims. Row (iv) summarizes the opportunity of the patent owner to amend patent claims during the
proceeding.
Table 1
Comparison of Patent Vitality and Opportunity to
Amend in U.S. Courts and the USPTO

i. Claim
Construction
Standard
ii. Presumption of
Validity
iii. Standard of
Proof to Invalidate
Claims
iv. Opportunity to
Amend Claims

a. Litigation

b. USPTO
Examination
Proceedings

c. AIA Post-Grant
Proceedings

plain and ordinary
meaning (+)

broadest reasonable
interpretation (–)

broadest reasonable
interpretation (–)

yes (+)

no (–)

no (–)

clear and
convincing
evidence (+)

preponderance of
evidence (–)

preponderance of
evidence (–)

no (–)

yes (+)

limited

In litigation (Column A), the patent vitality characteristics tip in favor
of the patent owner. The court presumes the claims are valid,197 interprets
them by the narrower—that is, less likely to intersect with prior art—plain
and ordinary meaning standard,198 and can only invalidate them by showing
clear and convincing evidence.199 The strength of the original claims due to
the patent vitality characteristics is balanced by a lack of opportunity to
amend claims or add new claims.200 In contrast, in USPTO examination proceedings (Column B), the patent vitality characteristics are less favorable to
the patent owner. The USPTO does not use a presumption of validity,201 it
construes claims according to the broadest reasonable interpretation,202 and
it can invalidate them by a preponderance of evidence.203 The relative ease of
invalidation in USPTO proceedings is balanced with a significant opportunity to amend.204
The relatively new AIA post-grant proceedings (Column C) lack balance
between claim vitality and extent of opportunity to amend. The claim vitality characteristics shown in cells (c)(i)–(c)(iii) match those of USPTO examination proceedings, and they are unfavorable to the patent owner. Unlike in
197. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 142–144.
199. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
200. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
201. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (2012).
202. See supra Section II.B.
203. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e).
204. See supra Section I.A.
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USPTO examination proceedings, however, the opportunity to amend is extremely limited.205 The USPTO’s tougher standard is justified based on the
patent holder’s ability to amend.206 But the current practice for post-grant
proceedings is unreasonably harsh for patent owners due to the relative ease
of invalidation coupled with the very limited ability to amend.207 The current patent vitality characteristics and the extent of the opportunity to
amend in AIA post-grant proceedings are out of balance and run contrary to
the practice in other USPTO proceedings and litigation.
B.

Serving the Goals of the America Invents Act

Increasing the opportunity for amendment in post-grant proceedings
would serve the AIA goals of stimulating innovation and strengthening U.S.
patents. The goal of strengthening America’s patent pool manifests in two
distinct ways: (1) elimination of bad patents, and (2) affirmation and
strengthening of viable patents. Early results from post-grant proceedings
before the Board demonstrate success in the first area.208 Indeed, it has been
easier and cheaper for third parties to eliminate bad patents in post-grant
proceedings when compared to litigation.209 The current practice of the
205. See supra Part II.
206. Burlington Indus. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Patent application
claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during examination proceedings, for
the simple reason that before a patent is granted the claims are readily amended as part of the
examination process.”); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining
that the broadest reasonable interpretation approach to claim interpretation applies in reissue
and reexamination proceedings in the USPTO, as in examination, because of the patent
owner’s ability to amend); cf. Bernie Knight, Should the Claim Construction Standard for PTAB
Post-Grant Proceedings Be Changed?, Patently-O (Mar. 12, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/03/construction-standard-proceedings.html [https://perma.cc/TY7K-JUXT] (arguing
that the broadest reasonable claim construction standard for post-grant proceedings would be
more appropriate under less burdensome amendment requirements).
207. See Tamimi, supra note 116, at 618 (citing Andrew J. Lagatta & George C. Lewis, How
Inter Partes Review Became a Valuable Tool So Quickly, Law360 (Aug. 16, 2013), http://
www.law360.com/articles/463372/how-inter-partes-review-became-a-valuable-tool-so-quickly
[https://perma.cc/6JZW-2S7V]) (“The ‘broadest reasonable construction’ . . . standard for
claim construction provides procedural advantages for petitioners.”); Knight, supra note 206
(“If the requirements for a patent owner amendment were less onerous, then a much stronger
case can be made that the broadest reasonable claim construction standard should be retained.”); see Letter from William G. Barber, President of Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, to
David J. Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/executive/Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx [https://perma.cc/2TX3-CJM8] (expressing
concern that the proposed double standard in claim interpretation, which was subsequently
adopted, would shift the balance of rights against patent owners).
208. See Davis, supra note 13 (discussing the commonness of complete invalidation in
inter partes reviews).
209. See Tom Engellenner, Comparison of Federal Court, ITC, and USPTO Proceedings in
IP Disputes 22, AIPLA (Jan. 2014), available at http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-in-Japan/Committee%20Documents/2014%20MWI%20Presentations/
Tom%20Engellenner%20%20IP%20Dispute%20Cost%20Comparison.ppt.
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Board, however, neglects the second component of the goal given that patents are easily invalidated with only a trivial opportunity for amendment.
Allowing a patent owner to narrow claims can result in a stronger patent
that is truly distinguishable from the prior art210 and is less likely to be invalidated in subsequent litigation.211 Limiting patent owners to one chance to
amend claims favors invalidation over upholding the patent with stronger,
narrower claims.
The prevailing view that U.S. post-grant proceedings are antipatent
could impede the AIA goal of encouraging innovation by discouraging disclosure of inventions in patents. Almost every affected party has criticized
the proceedings as antipatent. This is reflected in two pending congressional
bills that directly address the issue of motions to amend in USPTO postgrant proceedings.212 Former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, Randall Rader, has referred to the Board as “patent death
squads.”213 Criticism from practitioners is also abundant, as evidenced by
comments to USPTO rules and a constant stream of new blog articles spanning from the initial proceedings in 2012 to the present.214 These opinions
are detrimental to a policy of encouraging innovation. Patents confer property rights for a limited period of time in exchange for public disclosure.215
The patent system fosters innovation by rewarding patent owners with a
limited monopoly over the patented invention, and it ultimately benefits the
public by making the latest technology available.216 Nonetheless, applying for
a patent is discretionary. Inventors can choose to keep their inventions secret
and unprotected by patent rights, thereby depriving the public of the opportunity to benefit from the technology. The reputation of the AIA post-grant
210. Lethem, supra note 168, at 148 (suggesting that claims distinguishing an invention
from the prior art are more likely to be successful in European opposition proceedings). Indeed, studies have shown that patents that have undergone this type of post-grant opposition,
which commonly results in amendment, have “higher economic and technological relevance.”
E.g., Gieseppe Scellato et al., Study on the Quality of the Patent System in Europe, at 87 (2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/patqual02032011_en.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/G3TL-7NK9].
211. See Graham & Harhoff, supra note 133, at 24 (“To the extent that an opposition
system can improve the certainty that the owner, the infringer, and society have over the
validity of the patent, it may lead to efficient settlement, less litigation, and greater public
legitimacy . . . .”).
212. PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015); STRONG Patents Act, S. 632, 114th Cong.
(2015).
213. Peter J. Pitts, ‘Patent Death Squads’ vs. Innovation, Wall St. J. (June 10, 2015, 7:23
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/patent-death-squads-vs-innovation-1433978591
?cb=logged0.695007418980822 [https://perma.cc/N86Q-F5ZR].
214. See, e.g., Pardon & Brunner, supra note 2, at 10 (“The post-grant review procedure
has several advantages for a potential patent challenger.”); McKeown, supra note 107 (“The
PTAB has been so effective in cancelling patent claims . . . that the Board is being criticized as
anti-patent.”).
215. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–30 (1964).
216. Id. at 229 (“Patents are not given as favors . . . but are meant to encourage invention
by rewarding the inventor with the right . . . to exclude others from the use of his invention.”)
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proceedings creates a risk that there may be a shift to fewer inventions being
patented and disclosed to the public. A more expansive opportunity for
amendment in U.S. post-grant proceedings would reverse this undesirable
result.
IV. A New Way Under the AIA: Would Europe’s Approach
Work for the United States?
Although a full adoption of the European opposition approach to claim
amendments is undesirable, the United States should borrow certain characteristics to restore balance between vitality and opportunity to amend. Section IV.A analyzes whether the European approach would work for the
United States. Section IV.B proposes a way forward for claim amendments
in U.S. post-grant proceedings.
A. Europe’s Approach Is Unsuitable for the United States
Europe’s approach to patent claim amendments in opposition proceedings exceeds the intent of the AIA in terms of favorability to patent owners.
Therefore, the United States cannot wholly adopt the European opposition
approach to claim amendments. There are several key features of claim
amendments in European opposition proceedings: an expansive opportunity
to amend claims through the auxiliary request process; a claim construction
standard that mirrors litigation; a balanced evidentiary burden; and lax procedural requirements that favor substantive evaluation over hard-line rules.
The European system has both strong patent vitality characteristics and an
expansive opportunity for amendment, and it does not fit squarely into any
of the columns in Table 1 above.217 Moreover, the current U.S. evidentiary
burden and procedural requirements are necessary to accomplish the AIA
goal of strengthening patents and adhering to the statutorily mandated
twelve-month timeline.
The European approach of favoring patent owners in both patent vitality characteristics and the opportunity to amend requirements would not
work in the United States, because it would create a balance contrary to
what Congress intended. In assessing the suitability of Europe’s approach for
the United States, the USPTO should consider the extent of the opportunity
to amend together with the patent vitality characteristics: standard for claim
construction, presumption of validity, and standard of proof to invalidate
claims. The combination of the two characteristics creates the balance between claim vitality and the ability to amend.218 This balance favors patent
holders in European proceedings, and it works against patent holders in U.S.
post-grant proceedings.219 In order to bring U.S. post-grant practice in line

217. See supra Table 1.
218. See supra Section III.A.
219. See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
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with other patent proceedings (litigation and USPTO examination proceedings), the United States could adopt either a more expansive opportunity for
amendment or a plain and ordinary meaning claim construction standard,
but not both.
U.S. adoption of the European evidentiary burden for claim amendments would not serve the goals of the AIA. Although the current U.S. evidentiary burden is challenging for patent owners, it serves the AIA goal of
strengthening patents by reducing the chance of future invalidation. Adoption of a European-style evidentiary burden would benefit patent owners
and simplify the process for amending claims. But reducing the burden
would not necessarily strengthen patents, because it would increase the
chances of future litigation upon discovery of new prior art. In light of the
AIA goal of stronger patents, the current U.S. high evidentiary burden
makes more sense than the European standard: it ensures that amendments
entered during post-grant proceedings are resilient and unlikely to be defeated in future validity proceedings. Furthermore, neither Congress220 nor
the USPTO221 has shown any interest in modifying the evidentiary burden
for claim amendments.
The procedural requirements of European opposition proceedings
sharply contrast with the goals of the AIA. Because European proceedings
favor substantive consideration over hard-line rules,222 European patent
holders face only minimal procedural hurdles. Such an approach is wholly
inconsistent with the U.S. goal of providing a quick and cheap alternative to
district court litigation, because embracing an unfettered right to be heard
would drastically increase the length of post-grant proceedings and violate
the statutory time limit.223 Through two iterations of rule updates, the
USPTO has already made concessions on procedural rules that exist to further goals of efficiency and expediency.224
It is unlikely that the United States will fully converge with the European
approach, because European opposition proceedings are conducted on a
looser timeline and are more favorable to patent owners than the AIA contemplates in terms of claim vitality and the opportunity to amend. Although
the USPTO recently loosened some of the procedural hurdles, further concessions in this area would be detrimental to the tight AIA timeline. The
Board may continue to clarify requirements of the evidentiary burden

220. The pending bills do not suggest any change to the evidentiary burden in motions to
amend. See PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015); STRONG Patents Act, S. 632, 114th
Cong. (2015).
221. 2016 USPTO Amendments, supra note 139 (declining to modify the evidentiary burden despite comments to the contrary).
222. See supra notes 188–189.
223. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011).
224. See 2016 USPTO Amendments, supra note 139; May 2015 USPTO Amendments,
supra note 191.
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though written opinions, but it probably will not adopt the European approach because the current U.S. approach strengthens patents. The combination of Europe’s narrower claim construction standard and its expansive
opportunity for amendment does not fit within the U.S. model for balancing claim vitality and amendment, so a full adoption of these characteristics
is undesirable.
B.

A Way Forward in the United States

The most effective way the United States can meet the goals of the AIA
and comply with the twelve-month timeline while still maintaining the integrity of its proceedings would be to adopt characteristics of the auxiliary
request process of European opposition proceedings. This Note calls for a
change in the USPTO rules regarding claim amendment practice in AIA
proceedings. The proposal has two components: (1) permitting patent owners to submit multiple sets of claims to be considered in the alternative in
one motion to amend, and (2) eliminating the one-to-one assumption for
substitute claims. An effective solution will balance the expanded opportunity to amend with retention of the broadest reasonable interpretation claim
construction standard. The evidentiary burden and the procedural rules
should remain the same, as any significant modification would be detrimental to goals of the AIA.
Though adoption of both an expanded opportunity to amend and a
narrower claim construction is undesirable, adoption of one of these characteristics would better serve the goals of the AIA. The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit recently affirmed the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation claim construction standard in IPRs.225 Pending Congressional
bills, however, leave open the possibility for a shift in claim construction.226
Modifying the claim construction standard from broadest reasonable interpretation to plain and ordinary meaning would be a relatively simple change
to help bring the U.S. post-grant proceedings in line with the characteristics
of litigation.227 The currently restrictive opportunity to amend claims would
be balanced with more resilient claims. But continued use of the broadest
reasonable interpretation claim construction standard demands a more expansive opportunity for amendment.
Continuing to employ a broadest reasonable interpretation claim construction in AIA post-grant proceedings while expanding the opportunity
225. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, No. 15-446, 2016 WL 205946 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016). But there
is some speculation that alternative challenges to the USPTO rule may be forthcoming based
on “faulty procedure during rulemaking.” See David Boundy, Why Administrative Law Matters
to Patent Attorneys—In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC, Patently-O (Feb. 8, 2015), http://
patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/administrative-attorneys-technologies.html [https://perma.cc/
JBK5-D8QX].
226. PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015); STRONG Patents Act, S. 632, 114th Cong.
(2015).
227. See supra Table 1, col. A.
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for amendment would create a similar balance to that of USPTO examination proceedings.228 This modification would restore balance between claim
vitality and ease of amendment. Wholly adopting the European opposition
approach to extent of opportunity to amend claims would fine-tune claim
language, but it could also significantly increase the timeline of AIA proceedings and deviate from the adjudicatory nature of the proceedings. Thus,
a modified auxiliary request process would be the best solution.
Under a modified auxiliary request process, patent holders could file
multiple sets of claims in one motion to amend to be considered in the
alternative. As in European opposition proceedings, the Board would evaluate each request and grant the broadest request that does not read on the
prior art. In addition, the patent holder would submit all proposed claim
sets together at the time of the motion. This would eliminate the potentially
time-consuming, back-and-forth procedure of the auxiliary requests in the
European system. The proposal further recommends an elimination of the
one-to-one assumption for substitute claims to permit patent owners to
propose multiple claims in place of one canceled claim. These modifications
would give the patent owner a greater opportunity to amend claims to balance the petitioner’s ease of invalidation. This change fits within the text of
the AIA, which permits a patent owner to file one motion to amend and
provides for additional motions to amend in certain situations.229 Congress
did not intend for the Board to eliminate a patent owner’s opportunity to
amend prior to substantive consideration.230
Two limiting aspects of a patent owner’s opportunity to amend are: (1)
the number of alternative sets of claims to be considered and (2) the number
of substitute claims.231 As to the first issue, the AIA permits a patent owner
to file at least one motion to amend.232 The text of the statute is silent as to
whether the one motion may contain multiple claim sets as proposed in that
motion. Furthermore, the AIA grants the USPTO a significant amount of
discretion in allowing additional motions to amend in IPRs, stating that they
may be “permitted by regulations prescribed by the Director.”233 The foregoing provision would certainly permit the UPSTO to implement the modified
auxiliary request process for IPRs.234 As to the second issue, nothing in the
AIA contemplates the one-to-one assumption for substitute claims that the
228. See supra text accompanying notes 201–204.
229. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012).
230. Pending bills demonstrate Congress’s dissatisfaction with the first three years of postgrant proceedings. E.g., S. 1137; S. 632.
231. See supra Section II.A.
232. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1) (2012).
233. Id. § 316(d)(2).
234. The proposal of this Note may require some limitation in its applicability to PGRs
because the AIA only allows additional motions “upon the joint request of the petitioner and
the patent owner to materially advance the settlement . . . or upon the request of the patent
owner for good cause shown.” Id. § 326(d)(2).
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rule dictates.235 The AIA simply says the number of claims must be “reasonable.”236 The USPTO could abandon its one-to-one assumption for substitute
claims under the AIA’s reasonableness requirement, for example, by imposing a less restrictive limit on the number of substitutes.237
Opponents of expanding a patent holder’s opportunity to amend may
argue that such a practice would impede the Board’s ability to complete the
proceedings in the statutory twelve-month timeframe. However, differences
between this proposal and the European practice minimize this concern. European proceedings typically last between two and five or more years.238
Though this time frame is much longer than the one-year period required of
post-grant proceedings in the United States, the frequently reported fiveyear time period in European oppositions includes related appeals;239 the
one-year statutory limit of U.S. post-grant proceedings does not include
those appeals. Therefore, the timelines reported above may not be directly
comparable. Furthermore, the length of European proceedings depends on
many factors other than broad allowance of amendments. Although there
are many variables that can affect the timeline, the backlog at the European
Patent Office240 and the high rate of opposition241 are likely to be significant
factors. The European Patent Office is overburdened and each individual
proceeding is stretched out due to slow response times and unlimited opportunities to respond.242 In contrast, the U.S. proceedings should allow multiple claim sets in one motion to be considered by the Board simultaneously,
thereby eliminating the time-consuming, back-and-forth communication of
the parties. The Board would review all submitted claim sets prior to oral
hearings to prepare for a negotiation of which claim set is permissible.243
These changes adopt aspects of European opposition proceedings to provide
a meaningful opportunity for amendment without disregarding the statutory time limit set by the AIA.
Permitting patent owners to submit multiple sets of claims to be considered in one motion to amend and eliminating the one-to-one assumption
for substitute claims would alleviate some of the existing problems with the
235. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3) (2015).
236. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 119–120.
238. See supra note 190.
239. Robert P. Michal et al., US Post-Grant Review v. EPO Opposition Proceedings, IPR U.
Ctr. (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.iprinfo.com/julkaisut/iprinfo-lehti/lehtiarkisto/2013/IPR
info_3_2013_eng/en_GB/US_Post_Grant_Review/ [https://perma.cc/X5UE-J5YY].
240. See generally Victor Rodriguez, The Backlog Issue in Patents: A Look at the European
Case, 32 World Pat. Info. 287 (2010) (discussing the backlog in the European Patent Office).
241. Hall et al., supra note 190, at 11–12.
242. See Simon Mounteney, EPO: Well-Established Opposition Procedure, Managing Intell. Prop., Oct. 2008, at 66–68.
243. Oral proceedings in European oppositions typically last between one and three days.
Peter A. Jackman, European Patent Office—Opposition Proceeding—Oral Proceedings, in 2 Patent Office Litigation § 22:10 (Robert Greene Sterne et al. eds., 2015).
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U.S. proceedings while still accomplishing the goals of the AIA and adhering
to the statutory timeline.
Conclusion
The AIA established post-grant patent validity proceedings to create a
quick and cheap alternative to litigation and to achieve harmonization with
other patent systems. The long-standing European opposition practice may
serve as a valuable model for the U.S. practice. U.S post-grant proceedings
resemble European opposition proceedings in several ways, but European
proceedings are generally friendlier to patent owners and are much more
likely to result in patent claim amendment. Although the U.S. proceedings
have been successful in many areas, members of Congress, judges, and practitioners have expressed concern about the difficulty of amendment. A complete adoption of the European claim amendment approach would conflict
with AIA goals of providing a litigation alternative. But the U.S. practice
would benefit from adoption of a modified European auxiliary request practice where multiple claims sets are submitted at one time to be considered in
the alternative. Such a practice would most effectively create balance between the ease of invalidation of claims and the extent of opportunity to
amend while serving the goals of the AIA.

